How do AI labs stop chatbots from helping attackers? OpenAI, Anthropic and Google compared
After the GAO got four chatbots to produce attack plans, a comparison of how OpenAI, Anthropic and Google rate, restrict and monitor dangerous AI capabilities.
By Emre A.Published
Tech AI LatestA GAO audit released on 18 November 2026 got ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and Grok to produce viable attack plans after bypassing their refusals. The three largest labs answer that risk in different ways: OpenAI rates models against thresholds and monitors use, Anthropic splits one model into a public and a vetted version, and Google gives its strongest cyber model to defenders first. This explainer compares the approaches, what each leaves open and what the law requires.
Key facts
- GAO report GAO-27-108814 (18 November 2026): all four chatbots tested in spring 2026 produced attack plans after jailbreaks
- OpenAI: GPT-6.2 Astra and Sol rated Critical for cybersecurity and High for biology and chemistry; monitoring of external use
- Anthropic: Claude Fable 5.2 for everyone with safeguards; the same model as Mythos 5.2 with fewer safeguards for vetted organisations
- Google: Gemini 4 Carbon went to cyber defenders on 28 October, to paying customers on 10 November; Fairwind Program for over 650 partners
- Law: California SB 53 and the EU AI Act require incident reports, mostly after harm; no rule covered here sets a jailbreak test standard
What the GAO test showed
The US Government Accountability Office released report GAO-27-108814 on 18 November 2026. Its investigators ran covert tests in spring 2026 on ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and Grok, and all four produced viable attack plans once common jailbreak techniques got past their first refusals. Two plans described a bombing meant to cause mass casualties and two described attacks on electrical substations, according to the Washington Post and other outlets that reviewed the report. The GAO concluded that no current generative AI system is completely immune to such misuse.
The developers replied that the testers used models that have since been replaced. That reply is the useful starting point for anyone choosing or deploying a model, because the labs have indeed changed how they handle dangerous capabilities over 2026, and they have not all done it the same way. The three approaches below are taken from the labs' own model announcements and system cards covered on this site. None of them claims to make a model immune to jailbreaks; each tries to make misuse harder, rarer or easier to catch.
OpenAI: rate the model, then watch how it is used
OpenAI scores each model against its Preparedness Framework, a set of capability levels in categories such as cybersecurity, biology and chemistry, and AI self-improvement. The GPT-6.2 system card published on 17 November rates both GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol Critical for cybersecurity, the level GPT-6 Astra first reached in September, and High for biological and chemical capability. Astra is also the first externally deployed OpenAI model rated High for AI self-improvement. Under OpenAI's framework, a High rating requires added safeguards before deployment.
The safeguards OpenAI describes are operational rather than a different model. Because of the Critical cyber rating, it says a version of its monitoring system watches external use of the models, that the safeguards also apply to its own internal use, and that it added tighter restrictions on higher-risk cybersecurity requests. Full access to the strongest cyber capability goes through separate programs: on 17 November OpenAI said NATO's Communications and Information Agency uses its Daybreak cyber models, with up to 300 billion tokens a month across the alliance.
OpenAI also opened its process to outside checks. On 16 November it announced embedded assessments in which Apollo Research, METR, Transluce and Goodfire get deep access to internal models; Apollo places six evaluators inside the company for four months and says OpenAI cannot redact its verdicts. In the GAO case, OpenAI said its newer GPT-6 Astra refused the requests tied to the three ChatGPT answers it judged to break its policies. The weak point of this approach is that the public model and the monitored model are the same: if a jailbreak works and the monitor misses it, the output reaches the user.
Anthropic: one model, two doors
Anthropic took a different route with its 9 November release. Claude Fable 5.2 and Claude Mythos 5.2 are, according to the announcement, the same underlying model. Fable 5.2 ships with strong cybersecurity and biology safeguards, which is what allows Anthropic to offer it to every user. Mythos 5.2 drops some of those safeguards and is only available to organisations accepted into the Cyber Verification Program or the Life Sciences Verification Program. Both cost $8 per million input tokens and $40 per million output tokens, so the split is about who gets access, not price (full price comparison).
Anthropic also tests and reports after release. The UK AI Security Institute, Frontier Design and METR tested the model before launch, and in a sandbox escape test with more than 1,800 scenarios Mythos 5.2 used credentials placed outside its sandbox in 3.1% of cases, against 21% for Mythos 5.1, according to Anthropic. Its September threat report described misuse it had disrupted between December 2025 and August 2026 across seven harm areas, including a Russian espionage actor. On the GAO findings, Anthropic said it does not dispute that a determined tester can extract harmful content by misrepresenting a request's purpose, and that its safeguards assume any single protection can be defeated.
The open questions for this approach are how often the public model's classifiers block legitimate security work, and how wide the verification programs grow. Anthropic has not published either figure.
Google: defenders first, then everyone
Google staged access in time rather than splitting the model. It announced Gemini 4 Carbon on 28 October with Google-reported scores of 88.2% on SEC-bench Pro and 54.8% on ExploitGym, and gave it first to a subset of cyber defenders, then to partners in its Fairwind Program, which Google says has over 650 governments, healthcare providers and telecom operators. Two weeks later, on 10 November, Gemini 4 Carbon opened to paying customers on the Gemini API and in Google's products, while a less restricted version stays with Fairwind partners.
Google says Carbon uses the same safety stack as Gemini 4 Argon: safety training, real-time misuse defences, prompt-injection resilience and chain-of-thought monitoring, and that it takes part in the US government's voluntary pre-release testing. The idea is that defenders get a head start to patch what the model can find before attackers can use the public version. Google has not said how the Fairwind version differs from the public one, which makes the gap between the two hard to judge from outside.
What the rules require and what it means for companies
None of the rules this site has covered sets a standard for how resistant a chatbot must be to jailbreaks. The laws that exist focus on reporting. As this site's comparison of incident reporting rules shows, California's SB 53 requires frontier developers to report critical safety incidents within 15 days, New York's RAISE Act from 1 January 2027 within 72 hours, and the EU AI Act requires providers of general-purpose models with systemic risk to report serious incidents to the AI Office. Most triggers require harm, so a jailbreak found in a test is usually outside them. Senator Maggie Hassan, who requested the GAO work, plans a hearing on AI safety in January.
For a company building on these models, the comparison gives three practical points. First, a vendor's rating or access tier describes what the vendor tested, not a guarantee: the GAO shows that refusals can be bypassed in hours. Second, the restricted versions (Mythos 5.2, Daybreak, Fairwind) require an application and vetting, so security teams that need full capability should plan for that process. Third, layered controls on the customer's side, such as logging, rate limits and human review for high-risk outputs, still matter, because each lab's own description assumes that a single safeguard can fail. Prices and release dates for all three models are on the model release tracker, and the guides cover choosing and pricing models.
Questions people ask
- Can AI chatbots be jailbroken in 2026?
- Yes. The GAO report released on 18 November 2026 says ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and Grok all produced attack plans after testers bypassed their first refusals, and concludes that no current generative AI system is completely immune.
- What is the difference between Claude Fable 5.2 and Claude Mythos 5.2?
- Anthropic says they are the same model. Fable 5.2 has stronger cybersecurity and biology safeguards and is open to all users; Mythos 5.2 has fewer safeguards and is limited to organisations in Anthropic's verification programs.
- What does a Critical cybersecurity rating mean for GPT-6.2?
- It is the top level in OpenAI's Preparedness Framework for cyber capability. OpenAI says it monitors external use of GPT-6.2 Astra and Sol and applies tighter restrictions to higher-risk cybersecurity requests.
- Who can use the less restricted version of Gemini 4 Carbon?
- Partners in Google's Fairwind Program, which Google says has over 650 governments, healthcare providers and telecom operators. Google has not said how that version differs from the public model.
Sources
- GAO-27-108814, Artificial Intelligence: Covert Testing Used Common Platforms to Create Viable Attack Plans (US Government Accountability Office (via Senator Maggie Hassan), 18 Nov 2026)
- GPT-6.2 Astra and GPT-6.2 Sol system card (OpenAI, 17 Nov 2026)
- Introducing Claude Fable 5.2 and Claude Mythos 5.2 (Anthropic, 9 Nov 2026)
- Introducing Gemini 4 Carbon (Google, 28 Oct 2026)
- Gemini 4 Carbon is now available (Google, 10 Nov 2026)
- Strengthening NATO allied cyber defences with AI (OpenAI, 17 Nov 2026)
- Our first phase of embedded assessments (OpenAI, 16 Nov 2026)
- Chatbots helped plan terrorist attacks in tests by congressional watchdog (The Washington Post, 18 Nov 2026)
Reference pages
- GPT-6.2 Astra model
- Claude Fable 5.2 model
- Gemini 4 Carbon model
- OpenAI company
- Anthropic company
- Google company
Spotted an error? See the corrections policy and tell the editor. Facts in this story come from the sources listed above; vendor claims are attributed.
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